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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
OF THE SYRACUSE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
CASE NO. S-0058 
for a determination pursuant to Section 212 of 
the Civil Service Law. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Under §212 of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act), certain 
provisions of the Act do not apply to local governments that have adopted their own 
substantially equivalent provisions and procedures. That local option applies where 
there is a current determination by this Board that those local provisions and 
procedures and their "continuing implementation" are substantially equivalent to the 
provisions and procedures that apply to the State under the Act. 
Each year this Board's Office of Counsel canvasses the appropriate local 
governments to collect data on the operation of their local public employment relations 
boards (local boards). This annual canvass permits this Board to ascertain whether the 
continuing implementation of local provisions and procedures by the local boards meets 
the "substantially equivalent" requirement of the Act. 
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The Public Employment Relations Board of the Syracuse City School District 
(Syracuse PERB), also known as the Mini-Public Employment Relations Board of the 
Syracuse City School District, reported in response to the 1998 canvass that it had no 
members. At its September 28, 1998 meeting, this Board instructed Counsel to inquire 
bHh¥ Syracuse PERB^^ 
whether the Syracuse PERB intended to continue to operate. Counsel made that 
inquiry. On November 17, 1998, the Syracuse PERB's attorney responded that the law 
firm that represents the Syracuse City School District was "working with the 
superintendent to implement the procedure to re-establish a quorum of members to the 
local PERB," and that he expected "full compliance in the very near future." 
) Counsel canvassed the local boards in February 1999, and the Syracuse PERB 
did not respond. In later phone calls, the Syracuse PERB's attorney described 
continuing but unsuccessful efforts to ensure the appointment of a quorum. Finally, on 
May 19, 1999, Counsel instructed the Syracuse PERB's attorney to advise this Board 
by June 1, 1999, regarding the names of the members of the Syracuse PERB, as well 
as the dates of any meetings scheduled or already held. That letter advised that if the 
response indicated that the purposes and policies of the Act were still not being 
effectuated, Counsel would refer the matter to this Board for appropriate action. That 
letter, too, received no response. Counsel has referred the matter to us. 
We can no longer conclude that the continuing implementation of the local 
provisions and procedures by the Syracuse PERB, if they are being implemented at all, 
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is substantially equivalent to the implennentation of the provisions and procedures of the 
Act by this Board. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the determination of this Board dated 
February 8, 1968,1 approving the enactment establishing the Syracuse School District 
TocarPERB b ^ 
application and demonstration by the Syracuse School District local PERB that the 
continuing implementation of its local provisions and procedures is substantially 
equivalent to the implementation of the provisions and procedures of the Act by this 
Board. 
FURTHERMORE, PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that unless such application is filed 
by August 2, 1999, this Board shall, without further notice, rescind, pursuant to §212 of 
the Act, its order dated February 8, 1968, approving the Syracuse City School District's 
local enactment and such other orders as approved amendments to, or the 
reinstatement of, its local enactment,2 upon the ground that the continuing 
implementation of said local enactment and amendments thereof is no longer 
11 PERB 1J344 (1968). This Board suspended the Syracuse PERB's operation 
by an order dated November 28, 1986, School District Employment Relations Council 
of the City of Syracuse 19 PERB 1J3071 (1986), and reinstated its operation by an order 
dated December 22, 1986, School District Employment Relations Council of the City of 
Syracuse, 19 PERB fl3078 (1986). 
23 PERB 1J3008 (1970); 4 PERB P012 (1971); 4 PERB 1J3086 (1971); 6 PERB 
1J3010 (1973); 6 PERB TJ3061 (1973); 7 PERB P063 (1974); an order dated 
March 3, 1978; and 19 PERB 1J3078 (1986). 
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substantially equivalent to the provisions and procedures that apply to and are 
implemented by this Board. 
DATED: July 1, 1999 
Albany, New York 
^1AULU^J/{. 
ichael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
MarcX Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WILLIAM T. BRUNS, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-13349 
COUNCIL 82, AFSCME and STATE OF 
NEW YORK (GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF 
EMPLOYEE RELATIONS; DIVISION OF 
PAROLE; DIVISION OF BUDGET), 
Respondents. 
KATHLEEN C. BRUNS, for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
By letter dated March 26, 1999, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) assigned to 
conduct a hearing in this case ruled that the allegations in a charge by William T. Bruns 
set forth only three arguable violations of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act). Those allegations involve Council 82, AFSCME's (Council) agreement with the 
State of New York (Governor's Office of Employee Relations; Division of Parole; 
Division of Budget) (State) settling an overtime pay claim and the Council's failure to 
process grievances about a uniform allowance and longevity pay. The ALJ ruled that 
Bruns' other allegations did not set forth any violation of the Act and that only the three 
enumerated allegations would be litigated at the hearing that the ALJ had scheduled. 
In exceptions, Bruns argues that the ALJ's ruling is incorrect and not adequately 
explained. No response to the exceptions has been filed. 
We dismiss these exceptions as premature. 
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These exceptions are not filed as of right as Bruns believes they are. An appeal 
from an ALJ's ruling made during the processing of a charge which is still pending 
before the ALJ is considered only with our permission pursuant to §204.7(h)(2) of our 
Rules of Procedure. Permission for such interlocutory appeals has been consistently 
denied-unlessthe appeal presents extraordinary circumstances.- No extraordinary 
circumstances are presented by these allegedly incorrect rulings2 because they can be 
reviewed upon timely exceptions to the ALJ's dispositive decision and order. 
For the reasons set forth above, the exceptions are dismissed. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: July 1,1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
ohn T. Mitchell, Member 
.
 1
 United Transp. Union, Local 1440 (LoBianco), 31 PERB 1(3027 (1998); Town of 
Shawangunk, 29 PERB ff3050 (1996). 
2Watertown City Sen. Dist, 32 PERB 1J3022 (1999). 
") STATE OF NEW YORK PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, HOLLAND PATENT 
SCHOOL DISTRICT UNIT #7766, ONEIDA COUNTY 
EDUCATIONAL LOCAL 869, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-19012 
HOLLAND PATENT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
) NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (WILLIAM A. HERBERT of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
FERRARA, FIORENZA, LARRISON, BARRETT & REITZ, P.C. (CRAIG M. 
ATLAS of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Holland Patent School District Unit 
#7766, Oneida County Educational Local 869 (CSEA) to a decision of an Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ) on its improper practice charge alleging that the Holland Patent 
Central School District (District) violated §209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act). The charge, as amended, alleges that the District 
constructively discharged Gina Grogan because she filed a grievance by harassing her 
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to the point that she was forced to resign her employment. The ALJ dismissed the 
constructive discharge allegation, but found that a statement made to Grogan by 
Superintendent of Schools Anthony Baretta violated the Act because it was threatening 
under the circumstances in which it was made. The ALJ also held that a statement 
made by Carol Rood, Grogan'simmediate supervisor, did not violate the Act because it 
was not threatening. 
CSEA filed its charge on May 19, 1997, alleging that the District began harassing 
Grogan on January 23, 1997, and continued to harass her thereafter because she had 
filed a grievance.1 The harassment alleged was statements made to Grogan by Baretta 
on January 23, 1997, and by Rood on January 24, 1997. 
) On June 20, 1997, CSEA filed an amendment to the details of the charge, which 
stated that the allegations set forth in the amendment should be substituted for the 
allegations set forth in the charge as first filed. In the amendment, CSEA alleges that 
Grogan resigned from District employment on February 12, 1997, and that her 
resignation constituted a constructive discharge because it was the result of harassing 
statements made to Grogan by Rood and Baretta on various dates from November 28, 
1996 to February 11, 1997.2 
1Grogan filed a grievance on December 2, 1996, raising questions about her title 
and the duties appropriate to the full-time position she assumed in September 1996. 
2The details of the amended charge include the two incidents which were alleged 
in the original details of charge. 
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The ALJ dismissed the constructive discharge allegation upon a finding that 
there was not a causal relationship between the grievance filed by Grogan in December 
1996 and her decision to resign in February 1997. However, the ALJ reviewed both the 
remarks made by Baretta on January 23, 1997, and the remarks attributed to Rood on 
January-24r1997rFinding4hat-Baretta had made the statements-attributed to-himAthe 
ALJ determined that the District violated the Act and ordered it to cease and desist from 
questioning the appropriateness of unit employees' continued employment with the 
District based upon the number of grievances filed by an employee. The District was 
also ordered to post a notice. 
CSEA excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ erred in not applying 
y the correct legal standard for a constructive discharge case and in making certain 
credibility resolutions. The District excepts to the ALJ's determination that the Act was 
violated by Baretta's remarks to Grogan on January 23, 1997, but supports the 
remainder of the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision, in part, and reverse, in part. 
Grogan was employed by the District from 1989 as a part-time food service 
helper, and from 1992 as a full-time food service helper. In December 1996, she filed a 
grievance with Rood questioning her title and the duties she was performing. The 
3Based on her credibility resolutions, the ALJ determined that Rood had not. 
made the remarks on January 24 which Grogan attributed to her and dismissed that 
aspect of the charge. 
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grievance was processed through the third step, which was a meeting with Baretta, 
Grogan, Robert Nole and Peter Schram.4 The ALJ found that Baretta remarked to 
Grogan during the meeting that the number of grievances filed by Grogan and her 
husband was unusual.5 He explained that it was important for people to feel good 
about working for the-Districtand that the-District tookpride in solving problems in an 
informal manner.6 
On January 24, 1997, Grogan told Rood that the grievance was being 
withdrawn.7 On February 11, 1997, Grogan informed Rood that she was going to 
resign. Grogan tendered her resignation on the next day by letter to Baretta in which 
she alleged that the personality conflicts and the harassments she had endured were 
forcing her to resign. A few days later, Schram sought to have Grogan's resignation 
retracted because he felt her decision had been made under duress. The District 
thereafter sought elaboration from Grogan as to the allegations of harassment. An 
investigation was conducted by the District, after which it concluded that Grogan had 
not been harassed. Grogan's letter of resignation was formally accepted by the 
District's Board of Education on March 25, 1997. 
4Nole is the District's Business Administrator and Schram is the CSEA Unit 
president. 
5Grogan had filed two grievances before the December 1996 grievance and her 
husband had filed one Tievance. 
6The ALJ credited the testimony of Baretta, Nole and Grogan about the 
substance of Baretta's remarks. 
7The grievance was in fact withdrawn by CSEA on February 6, 1997. 
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From December 1996 to February 11,1997, Grogan alleges that she was 
subjected to several instances of harassment by Rood, Baretta and several unit 
employees, all in retaliation for the filing of the December 1996 grievance. The ALJ 
found that, apart from Baretta's remarks on January 23, 1997, either there was no 
connection between thefiling of the grievance and theactions alleged by Grogan to be 
improper or that Grogan's version of the incidents could not be credited. 
With respect to the events of February 11,1997, the ALJ found that Rood had 
called Grogan into the dish room to wash dishes because Grogan was late for her 
assignment. At the end of the day, Rood called Grogan into her office to discuss her 
attitude. Grogan indicated that she would be quitting her job. The ALJ took into 
, ) account that Rood had counseled Grogan on occasions prior to the filing of the 
December 1996 grievance, and afterwards about issues unrelated to the grievance. 
The ALJ determined that Grogan, by her own admission, had an ongoing disciplinary 
dispute with Rood. The ALJ found that Grogan's resignation on February 12 could not 
be divorced from the events of February 11, where Grogan was called into the dish 
room and later counseled by Rood about her poor work attitude. As the resignation 
was not attributable to any actions taken by the District because of Grogan's grievance, 
the constructive discharge allegation was dismissed. 
The ALJ made several credibility resolutions in reaching her decision to dismiss 
the constructive discharge allegation. The ALJ largely credited Rood's testimony over 
Grogan's. Specifically, with respect to the January 24, 1997 incident between Rood 
-^ and Grogan, the ALJ credited Rood. With respect to the January 23 meeting on the 
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grievance, the ALJ credited the testimony of Baretta and Nole as to the substance of 
Baretta's remarks, but she credited Grogan and Schram as to Baretta's demeanor. The 
ALJ's credibility resolutions are based upon the demeanor of the witnesses, the 
substance of their testimony and corroboration by other witnesses, or the undisputed 
nature of their testimony: After a careful review of the reeord7 we find that the ALJ's 
credibility resolutions are fully supported by the record and should be affirmed. "Our 
determination in this regard is in keeping with the weight appropriately accorded to such 
credibility determinations by the trier of fact who had the opportunity to observe and 
evaluate the demeanor of all the witnesses."8 
CSEA argues in its exceptions that the ALJ failed to articulate and apply any 
) legal standard with respect to the allegation that Grogan was "constructively 
discharged". The ALJ found that Grogan's resignation on February 12 was not proven 
to have been caused by any harassment stemming from the grievance Grogan had 
filed in December. 
Without specifically stating the standards to be applied, we find that the ALJ, 
nevertheless, correctly decided CSEA's constructive discharge claim. To establish a 
violation of §209-a. 1 (a) and(c) of the Act, it must be proven that the employee was 
engaged in a protected activity, that the employer knew of the employee's protected 
activity and that "but for" the exercise of protected rights, the employer's action against 
8Guilderland Teachers Aide Ass'n and Guilderland Cent. Sch. Dist, 32 PERB 
P023, at 3044 (1999). 
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the employee would not have been taken.9 Applying that standard, the ALJ determined 
that Grogan had been engaged in protected activity and that the District knew about the 
activity. However, the ALJ found that the act complained of in the amended charge, 
Grogan's "forced" resignation, was not caused by the District's response to the 
grievanceT but by legitimate criticism of Grogan'sjob performance. 
Having found no causal link between the exercise of protected rights by Grogan 
and the events which led to her resignation, the ALJ dismissed the portion of the 
charge alleging that Grogan had been constructively discharged. Having found that 
Grogan's resignation had not been caused by the District's reaction to her protected 
activity, there was no need for the ALJ to articulate a standard of constructive 
) discharge.10 Whether a discharge is actual or constructive, it must have been caused 
by an employee's exercise of rights protected by the Act for there to be a violation of 
the Act. Not having found the necessary "but for" causation linking the harassment to 
the grievance filing, the ALJ properly dismissed the constructive discharge allegation. 
We affirm the ALJ's decision in this regard. 
The ALJ erred, however, in considering whether Baretta's and Rood's 
statements on January 23 and January 24, 1997, respectively, violated the Act. Neither 
9See City of Salamanca, 18 PERB 1J3012 (1985). 
10Generally, a constructive discharge occurs when an employer "deliberately 
makes an employee's working conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced into 
an involuntary resignation." Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 325 (2nd Cir. 
1983)(quoting Young v. Southwestern Savings & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 144 (5th 
) Cir. 1975); Crystal Princeton Refining Co., 91 LRRM 1302 (1976); Kripke v. Benedictine 
Hospital, 169 Misc.2d 98 (Sup. Ct. Ulster County 1996). 
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the charge as originally filed nor as amended alleges that any statements made by 
Baretta or Rood themselves violated the Act. The charge as filed and amended alleges 
a pattern of retaliatory harassment which finally caused Grogan to resign. Baretta's 
remarks on January 23, and Rood's remarks on January 24,1997, were two of twelve 
incidents whichT when-taken together^ allegedly established a patternof-harassment— — 
which eventually forced Grogan to resign from employment with the District. The only 
violation alleged under the charge as amended is constructive discharge due to 
harassment. 
In its opening statement at the hearing and in its brief to the ALJ, GSEA 
reinforces that its only allegation is that Grogan was constructively discharged by the 
) District because of the District's continuous harassment of her, harassment caused by 
the grievance she filed. Because there was no separate allegation of violation based 
upon Baretta's statement on January 23, 1997, or Rood's on January 24, 1997, the ALJ 
should not have made a determination as to whether those statements separately 
violated the Act on a theory that they were threats. As we have held many times, we 
will not consider allegations which have not been raised.11 The ALJ's determination 
that Baretta's statements violated the Act but Rood's did not is, therefore, reversed. 
Based on the foregoing, we grant the District's exceptions and reverse so much 
of the ALJ's decision that finds that the District violated §209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act. 
The exceptions of CSEA are denied and the decision of the ALJ is otherwise affirmed. 
11
 County of Rockland and Rockland County Sheriff, 31 PERB 1J3062 (1998); New 
York City Transit Auth., 31 PERB P024(1998). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: July 1,1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R.Cuevas, Chairman 
5hn T. Mitchell, Member 
") 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, ULSTER 
COUNTY LOCAL 856, TOWN OF SHAWANGUNK 
UNIT, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-19740 
TOWN OF SHAWANGUNK, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (ROBERT REILLY of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
SHAW AND PERELSON, LLP (DAVID S. SHAW and SUSAN G. WHITELEY 
of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Ulster County Local 856, Town of Shawangunk Unit (CSEA) excepts to a decision by 
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing this charge. CSEA alleges that the 
Town of Shawangunk (Town) refused to negotiate in violation of §209-a.1(d) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally changed a practice of 
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• i 
paying 100% of the health insurance premiums for persons retired from positions in the 
negotiating unit CSEA represents. 
On a stipulated record, the ALJ held that Article IX of the parties' collective 
bargaining agreement, captioned "Health Insurance and Retirement", covered the 
-su-bjeGt-of-the-alleged--pFaGtiGe^K-elying-upon--our-FeGent--deGisi0nHn--F/Gf/G/a--yn/GH-F:fee--
School Districf (hereafter Florida), the ALJ held that the Town was privileged to adhere 
to the terms of the contract notwithstanding any more generous practice that might 
have existed regarding retiree health insurance. Adherence to that contract, according 
to the ALJ, could not be a unilateral change actionable under the Act. 
CSEA argues in its exceptions that the ALJ erred in applying the contract 
j reversion principles of Florida and the cases upon which Florida is based. It claims that 
the contract simply does not address the health insurance benefits for current unit 
employees upon their retirement. Therefore, according to CSEA, there cannot have 
been any waiver of its right to negotiate the changes in the Town's practice regarding 
retiree health insurance nor could there have been any satisfaction by the Town of its 
duty to negotiate those alleged changes. 
The Town argues in response that the ALJ's decision is correct and should be 
affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' arguments, including 
those at oral argument, we reverse and remand the case for decision in accordance 
131 PERB 1J3056 (1998). 
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; i 
with our decision herein. For reasons explained hereafter, the ALJ erred in dismissing 
this charge under Florida. 
Florida involved an application of what has come to be called a contract 
reversion defense to a refusal to bargain charge grounded upon an alleged unilateral 
-change-in an extra-contractual practice-embodying a-mandatorysubjectofnegotiation, 
That labor law principle, articulated years before2 Florida again applied it, rests on the 
axiom that the duty to negotiate any term and condition of employment can be satisfied 
by negotiations ending with an agreement upon that term. If the parties to a bargaining 
relationship have exchanged promises on a given subject and have fixed the terms of 
their agreement as to that subject, then it is that agreement which controls that term 
, j and condition of employment notwithstanding any noncontractual practices which may 
have developed with respect to that same subject. 
Barring objection by the negotiating agent, an employer is permitted to establish 
and maintain a practice more generous than the contract calls for, but the employer is 
not required by its statutory duty to negotiate to continue that practice. The employer 
may revert to the terms of the parties' negotiated agreement without violating its duty to 
negotiate. The reversion to the terms fixed bilaterally by agreement is not an action 
unilateral in nature, nor does that reversion constitute a change in the status quo of 
2Maine-Endwell Cent. Sch. Dist, 15 PERB 1J3025 (1982), aff'g 14 PERB fl4625 
(1981). 
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employment terms and conditions because it is the contract, not the practice, which 
defines the status quo for purposes of the duty to negotiate under the Act.3 
As we recently explained in County of Nassau,4 the essence of contract 
reversion is the parties' satisfaction of their mutual obligation to negotiate terms and 
conditions of employment—As duty satisfaction involves the-fulfillment-of statutory— — 
obligation, not the surrender of statutory right, waiver standards5 are not wholly 
transferrable for use in contract reversion cases, but neither are those standards 
entirely irrelevant. Just as the standards for waiver have been formulated in a way that 
guards against an improvident loss of bargaining right, so also must the standards for 
duty satisfaction be shaped to avoid too ready a finding that bargaining obligations 
have been fulfilled. A satisfaction of the duty to negotiate necessitates record evidence 
of facts establishing that the parties negotiated an agreement upon terms which are 
reasonably clear on the subject presented to us for decision. We reject any lesser 
standard for it would compromise the right and duty to negotiate and the public policies 
underlying the creation of that right and duty. 
Our disagreement with the ALJ's application of the contract reversion principle in 
this case stems from the ALJ's overly broad description of the subject in dispute. The 
subject in dispute is not as broad as "health insurance" or "retirement". Therefore, the 
3State of New York-Unified Court Sys., 26 PERB P013 (1993). 
431 PERB 1J3074 (1992). 
5See Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Newman, 88 A.D.2d 685, 15 PERB 1J7011 
(3d Dep't 1982) (subsequent history omitted). 
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parties' agreements in these general areas do not satisfy the Town's duty to negotiate 
the specific subject of retiree health insurance benefits. 
Article IX of the parties' contract has three sections. Sections 1 and 2, by 
CSEA's allegation, the Town's admission, and the clear terms of the contract itself, 
:-— concern the health insurance benefits of-active employees only. The health insurance 
benefits to be extended to employees while they are employed are a form of current 
wages for services then being rendered by them. The health insurance benefits 
extended to an individual upon that individual's retirement from employment are a form 
of deferred compensation representing a payment in the future for the services a 
former employee has rendered in the past. The parties' agreement to a form of current 
, compensation for active employees does not represent an agreement to any form of 
deferred compensation for former employees, including health insurance continuation 
after retirement. An agreement to the former simply does not satisfy any duty to 
negotiate as to the latter because the subjects of current and deferred compensation 
are fundamentally different. } 
Although the two distinct subjects we have identified fall within the general 
category of "health insurance", the duty satisfaction principle underlying contract 
reversion is not correctly applied to the broadest categorization of a subject matter 
which can be articulated. To hold to that view would substantially negate the duty to 
negotiate terms and conditions of employment, which is the strong and sweeping public 
. ) 
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i i ) 
policy of this State.6 Applying that theory of contract reversion to extreme, a collective 
bargaining agreement containing only a wage rate or a salary level would afford an 
employer the right to discontinue all other extra-contractual forms of current 
compensation. That result would be wholly contrary to the terms and the policies of the 
— — Act and cannot be countenancedr 
Without speculating as to how other subjects might be defined for purposes of 
contract reversion, "health insurance" subsumes many discrete subjects. The contract 
reversion principle must be applied to each of those separate subgroups. As relevant 
here, we need only make the most elemental of distinctions in subject matter. Current 
compensation is not deferred compensation. Therefore, the parties' agreement in 
\ sections 1 and 2 of Article IX of the collective bargaining agreement to a form of current 
compensation for active employees does not afford the Town any basis upon which to 
defend an alleged change in practice involving deferred compensation for former 
employees payable to them upon their retirement and thereafter. 
Florida is readily distinguishable from this case. In Florida, the parties had an 
agreement covering specifically the subjects of hours of work and break time, which 
were also the subjects of the practice the employer changed. Having fixed by clear 
agreement the number of hours of work and the amount of release time from work, the 
employer in Florida was permitted to revert to the terms of the parties' agreement, 
notwithstanding the more generous hours provisions which had existed by practice. 
6E.g., Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York v. PERB, 75 
J N.Y.2d 660, 23 PERB 1J7012 (1990). 
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The ALJ suggested in a footnote to his decision, and the Town argues in its 
response to the exceptions, that section 3 of Article IX, introduced with the word 
"Retirement", is another source for a contract reversion defense apart from the health 
insurance provisions in sections 1 and 2 of Article IX. The ALJ's note is not explained, 
but the Town argues that the New ¥orkState-and Local Employees-Retirement 
System, in which the Town participates, has a health insurance component for retirees. 
That representation of fact, however, is incorrect. The pension system does not have 
any health insurance components which we can identify. 
Retiree health insurance benefits are as different from a former employee's 
pension entitlements as those retirees' health insurance benefits are different from the 
health insurance benefits for active employees. Just as the Town's agreement to 
provide health insurance for active employees does not satisfy its duty to negotiate 
health insurance benefits for current employees upon their retirement, its agreement to 
participate in a pension plan lacking health insurance provisions does not afford it a 
contract reversion defense either. Pensions and health insurance are wholly different 
subjects. 
If section 3 of Article IX referred to a pension system only, our analysis of the 
contract reversion defense would be ended with the paragraph above. The analysis 
becomes more complicated, however, because the contract is arguably more 
extensive. Section 3, in relevant part, provides as follows: 
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The Town agrees to participate in the New York State Retirement Plan in 
accordance with the N.Y.S. Civil Service and to provide benefits 
thereunder and under the Social Security Law. 
Although the pension system referenced in section 3 does not have any health 
insurance components, Article XI of the State's Civil Service Law does make provision 
-for health insurance benefits for retirees under-a State-health insurance plan 
administered by the Civil Service Commission. Participation in that plan is open to 
municipalities, but optional, and is subject to approval by the President of the Civil 
Service Commission and the satisfaction of the several conditions to participation as 
fixed by extensive statutory and regulatory provisions. 
Upon this stipulated record, we cannot determine what the parties may have 
intended by the reference in section 3 to "in accordance with the N.Y.S. Civil Service." 
Section 3 of the parties' agreement, other than the part that establishes that employees 
have a pension plan, is ambiguous at best. The parties may or may not have agreed to 
have the Town participate in the State health insurance plan to provide health 
insurance benefits to some or all retirees. Even if some agreement had been reached 
in this regard, the terms of that agreement cannot be ascertained upon this record. 
The Town does not rely upon the Civil Service Law as the source of its contract 
reversion defense and CSEA maintains vigorously that all of Article IX of the contract is 
silent with respect to retiree health insurance. As the Town has the burden to prove the 
satisfaction of its bargaining duty, its contract reversion defense, to the extent it is 
based on section 3 of Article IX, must fail upon this record. 
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Given the basis for his decision, the ALJ did not decide whether the record 
established a past practice with respect to retiree health insurance that was changed by 
the Town. Nor did the ALJ consider the Town's other defenses or whether there can be 
a refusal to negotiate upon a unilateral change theory where the change in practice, 
when implementedy-affeets persons-who-are no longer public employees. We remand— 
for consideration of these issues in such decision and order as is appropriate. SO-
ORDERED. 
DATED: July 1,1999 
Albany, New York 
JI R. Cuevas, Chairman . Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF GARDEN CITY, 
ChargingPartyr 
- and - CASE NO. U-20358 
GARDEN CITY POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Respondent. 
CULLEN AND DYKMAN (GERARD FISHBERG of counsel), for Charging 
Party 
KRANZ, DAVIS & HIRSCH (ALLAN KRANZ of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Incorporated Village of Garden 
City (City) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a charge the City filed 
against the Garden City Police Benevolent Association, Inc. (PBA). The City alleges 
that the PBA violated §209-a.2(b) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) 
when it did not offer a memorandum of agreement (MOA) for membership ratification 
and when it submitted three demands1 in a petition for compulsory interest arbitration 
that had been resolved or abandoned during negotiations. 
1The proposals are for a Martin Luther King holiday, dental insurance and 
education expense reimbursement. 
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After a hearing, the ALJ dismissed the charge. The ALJ held that the PBA was 
not required to submit the MOA for ratification because ratification had been 
conditioned upon a prior approval of the MOA by the PBA's negotiating committee that 
rejected the MOA in a split vote. The second allegation was dismissed upon the ALJ's 
finding thatthe three proposals had not been-resolved or abandoned during the parties' 
r 
negotiations. 
The City argues in its exceptions that the ALJ was incorrect in fact, law and 
policy in all material respects. It argues that the MOA was reached unconditionally 
such that the MOA had to be submitted for ratification notwithstanding the negotiating 
committee's rejection of it. As to the second allegation, the City argues that the three 
^ proposals were abandoned by the PBA because they were discussed only twice during 
ten negotiating sessions, and not at all during four meetings with the mediator. 
The PBA argues in response that the ALJ's decision is unquestionably correct 
legally and factually and should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' arguments, we affirm the 
ALJ's decision. 
The obligation to submit a collective bargaining agreement for ratification is not 
always absolute. Just as the parties to a bargaining relationship may condition their 
collective bargaining agreement upon ratification by members of their respective 
constituencies,2 so may they make the ratification itself conditional. In this case, the 
Ratification of a contract is not required by the Act, but it is permitted. These 
parties expressly agreed to subject the MOA to ratification. 
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PBA's President, David Schichtel,3 and its Vice-President, Stephen Oswald, announced 
to the persons present when the MOA was drafted, including members of the City's 
negotiating team, that the MOA would be submitted for membership ratification if the 
PBA's negotiating committee approved it. The Village Administrator, Robert Schoelle, 
testified that those statements were made contemporaneously with the drafting of-the 
MOA and the City's representatives did not object to those statements. The City could 
not reasonably have understood from the comments made by the PBA's officers that 
the PBA would submit the MOA for ratification even if its negotiating committee rejected 
the MOA. The statements reserving voting rights to the PBA's negotiating committee, 
several members of which were not present when the MOA was drafted, is consistent 
only with the parties having an agreement or mutual understanding that the MOA would 
be submitted for ratification by the PBA membership only if the committee first 
approved it. 
That the MOA does not by its terms make the negotiating committee's approval 
a condition to the submission of that document for ratification is not controlling. Nothing 
in the MOA is inconsistent with ratification itself being conditioned upon the PBA's 
negotiating committee's approval of the MOA, a condition plainly established when the 
MOA was reached. Similarly, as the ALJ held, there is nothing in the PBA's constitution 
or bylaws that is inconsistent with its President's conditioning the membership's 
ratification upon the negotiating committee's prior approval of the MOA. To the 
3Schichtel participated in the mediation session at which the MOA was drafted by 
speaker phone and fax because he was out of state on that date. 
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contrary, the power vested in the PBA President to negotiate through and with a 
committee only emphasizes the President's right to articulate committee approval as a 
condition for ratification. Nor does the record establish that the negotiating committee's 
vote to reject the MOA was caused or influenced by any impropriety by Schichtel or 
Oswald, both of whom endorsed the-MOA and testified credibly, according to the-ALJr 
that they voted in favor of it at the meeting of the negotiating committee. 
The City next argues that even if the PBA is not bound to the terms of the MOA 
by its failure to offer that document for ratification, the PBA nonetheless violated its duty 
to negotiate by including the demands for the Martin Luther King holiday, dental 
insurance and education expense reimbursement in its interest arbitration petition. The 
City no longer argues that these three PBA proposals were actually resolved by 
agreement in negotiations, only that the PBA abandoned them. 
Contract proposals made by either party to a bargaining relationship can be 
abandoned and we agree with the City that an abandonment need not rest on an 
affirmative, overt act. But the record, fairly read, must establish an intent to abandon a 
proposal before we could conclude that an abandonment occurred. The City would 
have us find that the PBA abandoned the three proposals in issue because they were 
not much discussed. It is, however, not uncommon in collective negotiations for parties 
to not discuss one or more proposals for an extended period of time while they focus 
their discussions on issues which, either singly or as grouped, are then perceived to be 
of greater importance or relevance. The PBA's initial set of proposals, and the only 
amendment thereto, which reduced the number of its demands, both included the three 
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disputed items. There was discussion about those proposals each time the two 
packages of demands were submitted. Other than the length of time these three 
proposals were not discussed specifically, there is nothing in the record establishing the 
PBA's intent to abandon them and we are unwilling to deem an abandonment upon this 
ground alone, 
For the reasons set forth above, the City's exceptions are denied and the ALJ's 
decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: July 1,1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
7
 Marc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WILLIAM E. HEFFELFINGER, JR., 
Charging Party; 
- and -
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent, 
- and -
NORTH COLONIE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
WILLIAM E. HEFFELFINGER, JR., pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by William E. Heffelfinger, Jr., to a 
decision of the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
dismissing his improper practice charge alleging that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) violated §209-a.2(c) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by failing to pursue to completion most of 
the grievances he has filed against his employer, the North Colonie Central School 
CASE NO. U-20719 
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District (District).1 Heffelfinger was informed that his charge was deficient because it 
failed to specify the conduct of CSEA that allegedly violated the Act. Heffelfinger 
thereafter filed an amendment to the charge. Finding that the charge remained 
deficient, the Director dismissed it, noting that although Heffelfinger had alleged that 
CSEA was negligent and irresponsible in processing-his grievanGesrand-that-GSEA 
and the District had an agreement to suppress his grievances, he had not pleaded any 
facts to support those allegations. 
Heffelfinger excepts to the Director's decision, essentially realleging that which is 
in his amended charge. Neither CSEA nor the District has filed a response to the 
exceptions. 
) Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of Heffelfinger's 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the Director. 
Heffelfinger's lengthy improper practice charge and its amendment are replete 
with allegations of a lack of representation by CSEA but are almost devoid of facts in 
support of those allegations. Attached to the charge are copies of forty grievances filed 
by Heffelfinger, memoranda to various CSEA representatives from Heffelfinger and 
CSEA's responses to Heffelfinger. 
1The District was made a party to this charge pursuant to §209-a.3 of the Act. 
That section of the Act requires an employee's employer be added as a party to a duty 
of fair representation charge against the employee's union representative grounded 
upon the union's processing or failure to process a claim that the employer has violated 
its collective bargaining agreement with the union. 
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It appears from these many documents that Heffelfinger is a former president of 
the CSEA local. It also appears that, at some time in the past, Heffelfinger was 
employed by the District as the Assistant Head Bus Driver and that the District 
thereafter eliminated that position. Heffelfinger then became a Bus Driver for the 
District. His grievances in large part are attempts to restore the position of-Assistant 
Head Bus Driver by alleging that the work of that position has been reassigned to other 
District employees, both within and out of the unit represented by CSEA, that he should 
be performing the duties of the Assistant Head Bus Driver or that he is being harassed 
by fellow employees or supervisory employees of the District. It further appears that 
some of the grievances have been filed and processed, at least to the first step of the 
; grievance procedure, by CSEA and some by Heffelfinger individually. 
Heffelfinger alleges that CSEA has been irresponsible and negligent in the 
handling of twenty-two grievances which were the subject of an earlier improper 
practice charge2 and approximately eighteen subsequent grievances. CSEA provided 
Heffelfinger with a detailed response to each of twenty-two grievances filed over a two-
year period ending in August or September 1998. CSEA's response reiterates that all 
of those grievances had been discussed with Heffelfinger and explains CSEA's position 
with respect to each grievance. Correspondence from March 1999 relates to 
Heffelfinger's subsequent grievances alleging that the CSEA-District contract will be 
2An earlier charge filed by Heffelfinger alleging that CSEA had failed to respond 
to his inquiries about 22 grievances was settled with CSEA's agreement to provide 
Heffelfinger with a written response to each of those grievances. 
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violated in the future. CSEA responded that it would not seek from the District the 
extensive data sought by Heffelfinger and reiterated its belief that the contract had not 
been and would not be violated by the abolition of the Assistant Head Bus Driver 
position and the reassignment of those duties to other District employees, but that 
Heffelfinger was free to pursue his-own research and-to file his own grievancesr 
The duty of fair representation is breached only by 
conduct which is arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. 
Indeed, it has been widely held that allegations that a union 
has been careless, inept, ineffective or negligent in the 
investigation and presentation of a grievance do not 
evidence a breach of the union's duty of fair representation.3 
Here, from Heffelfinger's own pleading, it is apparent that the basis of his 
claim that CSEA breached its duty of fair representation is its failure to process his 
grievances beyond Step 1 of the contractual grievance procedure. It is evident from 
his pleadings that many of his grievances are repetitive and are also untimely as 
they refer back to the abolition of the position of Assistant Head Bus Driver over two 
years ago. His allegations as to motivation are conclusory, at best. There may well 
be a difference of opinion between Heffelfinger and CSEA regarding what 
3
 District Council 37, AFSCME, 28 PERB 1J3062, at 3138 (1995), citing Smith v. 
Sipe, 67 N.Y.2d 928 (1986); CSEA v. PERB, 132 A.D.2d 430, 20 PERB 1J7024 (3d 
Dep't 1987), afTd on other grounds, 73 N.Y.2d 796, 21 PERB 1J7017 (1988); Mellon v. 
Benker, 186 A.D.2d 1020, 25 PERB 1J7534 (4th Dep't 1992); Braatz v. Mathison, 180 
A.D.2d 1007 (3d Dep't 1992); Harris v. Schwerman Trucking Co., 668 F.2d 1204, 109 
LRRM 3135 (11th Cir. 1982); Findley v. Jones Motor Freight, 639 F.2d 953, 106 LRRM 
2420 (3d Cir. 1981); McFarland v. Teamsters, Local 745, 535 F. Supp. 970, 110 LRRM 
3022 (N.D. Texas 1982); Schleperv. Ford Motor Co., 107 LRRM 2500 (D. Minn. 1980); 
Liotta v. Nat'l Forge Co., 473 F. Supp. 1139, 102 LRRM 2348 (W.D. Pa. 1979), cert, 
denied, 451 U.S. 970, 107 LRRM 2144 (1981). 
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should not have been done, or what should have been done differently with respect to 
his grievances. But a difference in opinion between an employee and his or her union 
about the handling of grievances does not violate the Act.4 Heffelfinger has, therefore, 
alleged no facts which, if proven, would support a finding that CSEA breached its duty 
of fair representation in violation of §209-a.2(a) or (c)of the Act., 
Based upon the foregoing, the exceptions are denied and the decision of the 
Director is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: July 1, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ Miirc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
4District Council 37, supra, note 2. See also Association of Municipal Employees, 
Inc. and County of Suffolk, 29 PERB 1J3062 (1996). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WILLIAM HINDS II, 
•"-- Petitioner, 
-and-
JAMESVILLE-DEWITT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
SEIU, LOCAL 200B, 
Intervenor. 
WILLIAM HINDS II, pro se 
GARY LUKE, for Employer 
ROBERT TOMPKINS, for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On November 2, 1998, William Hinds II (petitioner) filed a timely petition for 
decertification of SEIU, Local 200B (intervenor), the current negotiating representative 
for employees in the following unit: 
included: All Maintenance Workers II, Maintenance Workers I, Crew 
Leaders, Groundskeepers, and Drivers/Messengers. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
CASE NO. C-4827 
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Upon consent of the parties, a mail ballot election was held on March 24, 1999. 
The results of this election- show that the majority of eligible employees in the unit who 
cast valid ballots no longer desire to be represented for purposes of 
collective negotiations by theJntervenor.-
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the intervenor be, and it hereby is, 
decertified as the negotiating agent for the unit. 
DATED: July 1, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chajrman 
7 M a r c A. Abbott, Member 
<f.<\ 
7 (John T. Mitchell, Member 
-Objections to the election filed by the Intervenor were dismissed by the Director 
of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director). 32 PERB ^4008 
(1999). No exceptions have been filed to the Director's decision and order. 
-Of the seven ballots cast, three were for representation and four against 
representation. There were no challenged ballots. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WEST HEMPSTEAD OFFICE STAFF ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4838 
WEST HEMPSTEAD UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, -
-and-
WEST HEMPSTEAD OFFICE STAFF ASSOCIATION OF 
LOCAL 153 OF THE OFFICE & PROFESSIONAL 
EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the West Hempstead Office Staff Association 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances.1 
-During the processing of the case, the Intervenor disclaimed any interest in 
representing the unit. 
Certification - C-4838 
Included: All Clerk Typists, Telephone Operators, Stenographers, Account 
Clerks, Library Clerks, Transportation and Building Clerk, Senior 
Typist Clerks, Senior Stenographers and Nurses. 
Excluded: The District Clerk and Board Secretary, Principal Account Clerk, 
Secretary to the Director of Business, Secretary to the Assistant 
Superintendent, and the Secretary to the Superintendent. 
FURTHER7ITT5TURUEREDIhattheTaboveTiarrTed publice^mployer shall 
negotiate collectively with the West Hempstead Office Staff Association. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: July 1, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
& Marc AT Attfbtt-, Member 
f /John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING 
ENGINEERS, LOCAL 17, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4872 
TOWN OF BOSTON, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the International Union of Operating Engineers, 
Local 17, has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
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Included: All full-time employees of the Town Highway Department. 
Excluded: Highway Superintendent, Deputy Highway Superintendent, 
Working Crew Chief, clerical employees, and all others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 17. 
the duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: July 1, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Mtphael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
//// vuk // Marc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
